EDITORIAL

Prevention and control of tuberculosis during air travel
The potential transmission of tuberculosis infection on board aircraft reported first in the 1990s, 1,2 the emergence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) as serious public health problems, 3 and the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 4 have raised considerable anxiety among travellers, public health authorities, airline companies and the media. A number of contact investigations has shown that transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis may occur, although rarely, during long (more than 8 h) flights from an infectious source (a traveller with infectious pulmonary tuberculosis) to other passengers sitting in proximity. However, as yet, no cases of active tuberculosis disease following exposure on board aircraft have been reported.
In this special issue of the journal devoted to tuberculosis and air travel, Dowdall et al. describe the perspective of the air companies, stressing the importance of having a regulatory framework such as the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR). The appropriate technology to ensure quality of air in the cabin of the aircraft, the role of the airline in managing a person suspected of tuberculosis, and the essential collaboration between airline and public health authorities are emphasized. However, the limitations of air companies in preventing an infectious person from travelling are also clearly expressed, showing that, regardless of the willingness to cooperate with public health authorities, it will not be easy to prevent potential exposures on board.
Based on an analysis of reported patterns and epidemiological characteristics, Scholten et al. demonstrate that in Canada, air travel by individuals with active tuberculosis increased in the period 2006e2008. The authors describe the difficulty in obtaining complete information on passengers for contact investigation. They note that 82% of the 104 reported active tuberculosis cases were highly infectious, sputum smear-positive patients. Expectedly, a vast majority (87%) of reported active tuberculosis cases were people born outside Canada.
Marienau et al. from United States Centres for Disease Control describe tuberculosis investigations associated with air travel over a period of 1.5 years. They found that only 22% (758) of presumed contacts of 131 index cases had tuberculosis test results reported. Among them, 182 (24%) passenger-contacts had positive test results, but positivity was strongly associated with other risk factors for tuberculosis infection (OR 23; p < 0.001). No case of active tuberculosis was ever reported among contacts. Therefore, the risk of M. tuberculosis transmission during air travel remains difficult to quantify, although it is presumably low. A detailed analysis by Kornylo-Duong et al. on three investigations among contacts of air travellers with infectious tuberculosis shows that 15 out of 16 air travellers who tested positive for latent tuberculosis infection were from countries with high tuberculosis incidence. Therefore, establishing a relationship between on board exposure and transmission of infection is unwarranted.
Martinez et al. present the main features of the 3rd edition of the WHO guidelines on the prevention and control of tuberculosis during air travel which was published in 2008. 5 This version includes guidance on the assessment of infectiousness and on the procedures, roles and responsibilities involved in the prevention of transmission of infection on board aircraft. It also describes the way to deal with incidents when they occur, the basic provisions of IHR, and the measures that could apply to incidents related to the potential of tuberculosis transmission among air travellers. Much of the information and guidance contained in this document may also be useful for prevention and control of other airborne infectious diseases in the context of air travel.
In a concluding article of this special issue, Plotkin and Hardiman detail the provision of the International Health Regulations (2005) to address the risk of international spread of airborne diseases such as tuberculosis during air travel and transportation.
Overall, this special issue underscores the importance of monitoring tuberculosis transmission that can occur during air travel while emphasizing clearly that current procedures for contact investigation are heavy and often not very productive. More research is needed to better assess the real risk of transmission during air travel. Likewise, innovative and simpler procedures that, first, reduce the risk of having an infectious passenger on board and, second, allow rapid investigation of possible contacts need to be explored rapidly if investigation efforts have to become feasible on a largerscale and more cost-effective than they appear to be today.
